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Abstract
A new voting rule for electing committees is described. Specifically, we
use approval balloting and propose a new voting procedure that guarantees
that if there is a committee that represents (with a given proportion of rep-
resentatives) all of the existing voters, then the selected committee has to
represent all of voters in at least the same proportion. This property is a way
of selecting a committee that represents completely all of voters when such
a committee exists. The usual voting rules in this context do not satisfy this
condition.
Keywords: Approval balloting, committee election, unanimity, justified
representation, representativeness
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1. Introduction
The problem of selecting a representative committee has been widely
studied. In fact, there are several approaches to this problem in the literature.
Much of the known multi-winner rules are based on the assumption that
voters have totally ordered preferences regarding the candidates.
In contrast, this paper focuses on approval-based rules by which voters
have dichotomous preferences (each voter sorts the candidates as either good
or bad). Approval Voting (Brams and Fishburn, 1978; Fishburn and Brams,
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1981) is an appealing procedure for single-winner elections whenever voters
have dichotomous preferences. Voters approve as many candidates as they
wish (Approval Balloting), and the candidate with the most approvals wins.
Approval Voting is known to fulfill many good properties when voters have
dichotomous preferences. Recently, in Gehrlein and Lepelley (2015), different
scenarios using both types of preferences (dichotomous and complete orders)
have been analyzed in order to compare Approval Voting with other scoring
rules.
Approval balloting is also useful in committee elections where a sub-
set of candidates should be selected. There are different ways of aggre-
gating approval ballots in order to choose a committee of size s. Kilgour
(2010) and Kilgour and Marshall (2012) surveyed methods using approval
ballots in multi-winner elections. Some of them are generalizations of the
Approval Voting procedure; others are related to threshold or centralization
procedures, where representativeness plays a more significant role. Besides
Approval Voting (AV), other interesting procedures are Representativeness
(Monroe, 1995; Potthoff and Brams, 1998), Proportional Approval (PAV)
(Simmons, 2001; Thiele, 1890), Threshold-Majority (Fishburn and Pekec˘,
2004), Minimax Approval voting (MAV) (Kilgour et al., 2006), Satisfaction
Approval (SAV) (Brams and Kilgour, 2010), etc.
Some of the proposed rules present a lack of representativeness, suffering
from what is known as the tyranny of the majority (50’01% of the voters could
determine the selected committee, leaving almost half of the voters without
representation). When the goal is to choose a committee that represents
the greatest number of voters this lack of representativeness is an important
handicap.
Monroe (1995) and Elkind et al. (2014) propose examples where represen-
tation is a focal objective. Although they use a non dichotomous approach,
their examples (the selection of a set of newspapers for a graduate common
room (Monroe, 1995), or the selection of movies for a long-distance flight
(Elkind et al., 2014)) are clear situations in which having a representative
for the greatest number of voters would be the main goal and the information
about the preferences might be dichotomous in a natural way. Committees
that are constituted, not to make final decisions (where the committee should
be a reflection of the electorate) but rather to elaborate pre-proposals where
each voter’s opinion should be considered, are rather common. This paper
focuses on such types of contexts, where the goal is to select committees that
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represent the largest number of voters.
Sometimes, in order to ensure some representation using dichotomous
preferences, restrictions are established on the admissible ballots to ensure
more representative committees2. Nevertheless, in line with approval ballot-
ing philosophy, a modification in the process of aggregating ballots would be
more adequate than a limitation on voters’ opinions.
In recent works, Aziz et al. (2015), Aziz and Walsh (2014) and Sa´nchez-
Ferna´ndez et al. (2016) study new properties related to representativeness:
Justified Representation (JR), Extended Justified Representation (EJR), Pro-
portional Justified Representation (PJR), among others. Justified Represen-
tation is the weakest of these conditions and it should be a necessary require-
ment when representation of the different opinions of the voters is important.
Justified Representation ensures that a large group of voters with shared pref-
erences should have at least one representative allocated to them. Aziz et al.
(2015) show that most of the standard approval-based multi-winners rules
do not satisfy JR and, for some of them, they propose natural modifications
to overcome this lack of representation.
In this work we investigate a new axiom related with representation,
which we call α-unanimity. The idea is that when there is a committee
that represents all of the voters (in a given proportion α), then the selected
committee has to represent all of the voters in at least the same proportion.
We think that in the afore-mentioned context, where the main objective is to
select a committee that represents the greatest number of voters, it is indeed
an appealing property. As far as we know, none of the standard approval-
based multi-winners rules hold α-unanimity for positive values of α. We
define a new voting rule, the Lexi-unanimous Approval Voting rule (LUAV),
which holds α-unanimity. This rule allows us to achieve the broadest degree
of consensus and to choose a committee in which, if possible, all the voters
are represented. We prove that the LUAV rule also satisfies JR.
2For the elections to the Senate of Spain (The Upper House of the Spanish Parliament)
each province elects four senators regardless of their population. In order to obtain a more
representative committee, under current legislation, each voter should mark up to three
candidates’ names.
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2. Preliminaries
We assume throughout this paper that n > 1 and k > 1 are the numbers
of voters and candidates, respectively, and we denote the set of voters by N
and the set of candidates by K .
An approval ballot is a binary k-vector v = (v1, v2, ..., vk) ∈ {0, 1}k where
the value 1 or 0 for vi indicates the approval or disapproval, respectively, of
candidate i. For each v = (v1, v2, ..., vk) ∈ {0, 1}k, |v| = Σki=1vi indicates the
number of approved candidates in the ballot v.
An approval ballot profile is a vector V = (v1, v2, ..., vn) ∈ {0, 1}nk where
vj ∈ {0, 1}k, j ∈ N , is the voter j’s approval ballot.
Although we sometimes use the candidates’ numbers to denote a commit-
tee, it can also be represented by a binary vector C = (c1, c2, ..., ck) ∈ {0, 1}k
where the value 1 or 0 for ci, i ∈ K, indicates whether candidate i is or not
a member of the committee C. We also use i ∈ C to denote that candi-
date i is in the committee C. As before |C| = Σki=1ci denotes the number of
members in this committee. For any approval ballot v and any committee C,
vC = Σki=1vici denotes how many candidates in committee C are approved in
the ballot v. For any two ballots v and w, vw = (v1w1, v2w2, ..., vkwk) rep-
resents the agreement between ballots v and w and then | j∈N vj| indicates
the number of candidates approved by all voters.
We denote by ξ the set of feasible committees, and by ϑ the set of admis-
sible ballots. In general, ξ ⊆ {0, 1}kr {−→0 } and ϑ ⊆ {0, 1}kr {−→0 }. It seems
reasonable that the selected committee must contain at least one candidate.
On the other hand, blank ballots will not be considered for the aggregation
procedure. In most cases there are other a priori restrictions on these sets
and they can not be the whole set {0, 1}k r {−→0 }. A typical restriction on
ξ is that only committees of a given size are possible. In this case, we will
denote by ξs the set of committees with exactly s members.
Ballot restrictions are often imposed in fixed-size committee elections.
Usual examples are when ballots that name more than a prefixed number
of candidates are discarded. We are not going to consider ballot restrictions
because they mask the fact that the election is conducted under approval
balloting. Nevertheless, in contexts where this kind of restrictions exists our
proposal could be applied without modifications.
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Representational requirements are also very usual (balanced representa-
tion of men and women, representation from different geographical regions,
representation from different faculties or departments, etc.). These represen-
tational requirements are usually guaranteed by restricting the set of admis-
sible committees (Kilgour, 2010; Fishburn and Pekec˘, 2004).
In general, an approval-based committee election problem can be repre-
sented as
(
N,K, ϑ ⊆ {0, 1}k r {~0}, ξ ⊆ {0, 1}k r {~0}
)
. A voting rule in this
context is a function, possibly multi-valued, ψ : ϑn −→ ξ, where CV ∈ ψ (V )
represents an elected committee when V ∈ ϑn is the approval ballot profile
proposed by the voters. Whenever the voting rule does not uniquely select a
committee, we suppose that ties are broken according to a pre-fixed priority
order over the admissible committees.
As afore-mentioned, the size of the elected committee is a common restric-
tion usually established in advance. We are going to focus on this particular
context, in which the family of feasible committees is ξs, 1 ≤ s < k. More-
over we do not restrict the voters’ opinions, so ϑ = {0, 1}kr{~0}. In this case
we call the voting rule the s-committee voting rule.
Given a ballot profile V = (v1, v2, ..., vn), for any candidate i ∈ K
its approval score is the number of voters approving candidate i, that is,
App (V, i) = Σnj=1v
j
i . A natural way to use approval ballots to select a com-
mittee is to choose the committee C ∈ ξ maximizing Σi∈CApp(V, i). This
rule, which has been adopted by several academic and professional societies,
is known as Simple Approval Voting (AV) and it is an obvious generalization
of Approval Voting for a single winner. Since AV for single-winner elections
has been widely studied and it has appealing properties, a desirable property
for committee selection rules is that, when applied to the particular case
s = 1, it selects a candidate who wins under approval voting.
Definition 1. (Kilgour and Marshall, 2012) An s-committee voting rule is
approval-based if and only if when s = 1 it selects the candidates who win in
single-winner Approval Voting.
Not all the committee selection rules defined in the literature are based on
Approval Voting (see Kilgour and Marshall (2012)).
When a committee of size s > 1 has to be selected, as commented, prop-
erties on representativeness may be crucial and it is known that the voting
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rules in the literature may generate outcomes that are highly unrepresen-
tative of the electorate. Within this approach Aziz et al. (2015) study an
interesting property.
Definition 2. (Aziz et al., 2015) A committee C of size s provides justified
representation for the approval-based committee election problem (N,K, ϑ, ξs)
if there does not exist a set of voters N∗ ⊆ N with |N∗| ≥ n
s
such that
| j∈N∗ vj| ≥ 1 and vjC = 0 for all j ∈ N∗. An s-committee voting rule
based on approval voting satisfies justified representation (JR) if it selects
committees that provide justified representation.
Justified representation is a weak condition establishing that if a subset
of voters of a considerable size agree on at least one candidate, the opinion
of someone in this group should be taken into account. AV, SAV and PAV
voting rules do not fulfil JR (see Aziz et al. (2015)). Aziz et al. (2015) use an
algorithm (Greedy Approval Voting (GAV)) selecting a committee providing
justified representation, proving in this way that such a committee always
exists. Aziz et al. (2015) and Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez et al. (2016) analyze other,
more restrictive, types of representation properties but as Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez
et al. (2016) claim, “justified representation is a very interesting axiom, and
that it must be a necessary requirement (although not a sufficient one) for
considering the use of an approval-based multi-winner voting rule when it is
desired that the winning set represents the different opinions or preferences
of the agents involved in the election”.
We are interested in voting rules that provide committees that represent
the greatest number of voters as possible. In fact, we look for a rule that
selects a committee that represents all voters when it exists. The concept of
α-unanimity tries to capture this idea. We first define, for each proportion
α ∈ [0, 1], each ballot profile V, and each committee C, the α-agreement level
as
dα(V,C) =
∣∣∣∣{j ∈ N : vjCmin (|vj|, |C|) ≥ α
}∣∣∣∣ .
The parameter α can be interpreted as the proportion of the committee
that should coincide with any voter’s ballot in order to consider that the
committee represents the voter. Therefore, α can be seen as the degree of
representation required. The extreme cases appear when α = 0 (no repre-
sentation at all) and α = 1 (total agreement on the committee). Of course,
the larger α is, the more representative the committee will be.
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Definition 3. For a fixed α ∈ [0, 1], we say that committee C is α-unanimous
for the voting profile V if dα(V,C) = n.
Then, α-unanimity means that committee C represents all voters at least to
the proportion α.
Definition 4. An s-committee voting rule satisfies α-unanimity if, when an
α-unanimous committee exists, the procedure selects α-unanimous commit-
tees. That is, if there is a committee S ∈ ξs such that dα(V, S) = n, then for
any C selected by the voting rule, dα(V,C) = n.
The property of α-unanimity implies that when there is a committee so
that all voters agree at least to a proportion α, the selected committee should
be also acceptable for all voters to the same degree. Of course, all procedures
satisfy 0-unanimity because for every C and V , d0(V,C) = n. On the other
hand, for α = 1, d1(V, S) = n means that all voters unanimously agree
with committee S, hence it seems reasonable to select a committee with this
maximum degree of consensus. Note that when using approval balloting,
several committees supported by all the voters may exist. The 1-unanimity
is related to the strong unanimity property in Elkind et al. (2014), which
conveys that if a committee supported by all the voters exists, the committee
selected must therefore be supported by all the voters as well.
GAV committees, which fulfill JR, may not be α-unanimous for positive
values of α as the following example shows.
Example 1. Six voters have to choose a committee of two from three can-
didates. Let K = {1, 2, 3}. Table 1 shows the approved candidates for each
voter.
GAV provides two possible committees C1 = {1, 2} and C2 = {1, 3}. Note
that α-unanimity is not fulfilled for α = 0.5, because d0.5(V,C) = 6 when
C = {2, 3} and d0.5(V,C1) = d0.5(V,C2) = 5.
In the context described in this work, in order for all voters get some
representation, solutions fulfilling α-unanimity for some α > 0 would be
desirable. Unfortunately, none of the usual voting rules satisfy this property,
even for small positive values.
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# Voters
Candidates
1 2 3
2 1 1 0
2 1 0 1
1 0 1 0
1 0 0 1
6 4 3 3
Table 1: Example 1 ballots profile.
3. Lexiunanimous approval voting rule
To define a voting rule satisfying α-unanimity for positive values of α, we
need some previous notation. Although dα(V,C) can be computed for any
α ∈ [0, 1], the quotient
vjC
min (|vj|, |C|) (1)
can reach only a finite number of values. The reached values depend on s, C
and the number of candidates supported by each voter. Given an s-election
problem (N,K, ϑ, ξs), let
Λs = {α ∈ [0, 1] : α = rt
t
, t = 1, 2, ..., s; rt = 0, 1, 2, ..., t}.
Λs is a finite set and contains all the possible values for the quotient (1), and
therefore the relevant values of the parameter α. We denote by −→αs = (αj)
the ordered vector of the different values in Λs (i < j if and only if αi < αj).
Note that, for each −→αs, the first coordinate is α1 = 0 and the last coordinate
is 1.
For each voters’ profile V and each committee C in the s-election problem
(N,K, ϑ, ξs), we compute the vector U
αs (V,C), with the same number of
coordinates as −→αs, defined by Uαsi (V,C) = dαi(V,C) for all i. It is easy to
verify that for each voters’ profile V and each committee C, the coordinates
of Uαs (V,C) are non-increasing (i < j implies Uαsi (V,C) ≥ Uαsj (V,C)) and,
moreover, Uαs1 (V,C) = n (since α1 = 0). These vectors will allow us to
define our procedure for s-election problems. We first provide an example.
When selecting a committee of two candidates the possible values of quo-
tient (1) are 0, 1
2
and 1, so −→αs =
(
0, 1
2
, 1
)
. In the particular case of Example
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1 the vectors Uαs (V,C) for the ballot profile V and the committees in ξ2 are
displayed in Table 2.
C ∈ ξ2
−→αs =
(
0, 1
2
, 1
)
Uαs1 (V,C) U
αs
2 (V,C) U
αs
3 (V,C)
(1, 1, 0) 6 5 3
(1, 0, 1) 6 5 3
(0, 1, 1) 6 6 2
Table 2: Uαs (V,C) vectors for Example 1.
Definition 5. Given an s-election problem (N,K, ϑ, ξs), the Lexiunanimous
Approval Voting rule (LUAV) assigns to each ballot profile V any committee
C such that Uαs (V,C) is maximum with respect to the lexicographical order.3
The following result summarizes important properties of the Lexiunani-
mous Approval Voting rule.
Theorem 1. The Lexiunanimous Approval Voting rule
i) is α-unanimous, for any α ∈ [0, 1]
ii) is an approval-based voting rule
iii) satisfies JR
Proof.
i) Let α∗ ∈ [0, 1] and suppose there are S ∈ ξs and V ∈ ϑn such that
dα∗ (V, S) = n. By construction, for each α
′ < α∗, dα′ (V, S) = n.
Let us consider a committee CL selected with the LUAV rule. Then
Uαs
(
V,CL
)
<L Uαs (V, S). So, dα∗
(
V,CL
)
= n and CL is an α∗-
unanimous committee.
3The lexicographical order is defined as (x1, x2, ...xm) L (y1, y2, ...ym) if and only
if there is i ∈ {1, 2, ...,m} such that xj = yj for all j < i and xi > yi. The
weak relation (x1, x2, ...xm) <L (y1, y2, ...ym) means (x1, x2, ...xm) L (y1, y2, ...ym) or
(x1, x2, ...xm) = (y1, y2, ...ym). Note that being the set of vectors {Uαs (V,C) : C ∈ ξs}
finite, the lexicographical order always reaches a unique maximum (although several com-
mittees may provide this maximum).
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ii) The possible values for α in a single-winner problem are α = 0 and α =
1. As d0 (V, i) = n for each candidate i, the Lexiunanimous Approval
Voting rule selects the candidate with the greatest value d1 (V, i); that
is, the candidates receiving the most approval votes.
iii) Let CL ∈ ξs be a committee selected with the LUAV rule. Then
Uαs
(
V,CL
)
<L Uαs (V,C)
for all C ∈ ξs. By way of contradiction let us suppose that there is a
coalition N∗ ⊆ N with |N∗| = n∗ ≥ n
s
such that |j∈N∗vj| ≥ 1 and
vjCL = 0 for all j ∈ N∗. That is, no candidate supported by any voter
in N∗ is selected.
It is easy to verify that for all C ∈ ξs,
Uαs2 (V,C) = |
{
j ∈ N : vjC 6= 0} | = n− |{j ∈ N : vjC = 0} |
Then, Uαs2
(
V,CL
)
6 n− n∗.
Consider the set of candidates rearranged in the following way: first
the s candidates selected in CL ordered in such a way that if i < i′
then App(V, i) > App(V, i′); next the candidate s + 1 is a candidate
supported by all the voters in N∗; and then the rest of candidates in
any order.
For each i ∈ K denote by
ai(V,C) = |
{
j ∈ N : vji = 1, i′ < i→ vji′ = 0
} |
that is, the number of voters supporting candidate i but none of the
previous candidates.
We can compute Uαs2
(
V,CL
)
as
Uαs2
(
V,CL
)
= Σsi=1ai(V,C
L)
If for some i ∈ CL, ai(V,CL) < n∗ we can consider the committee
C ∈ ξs formed by the candidates in CL but changing candidate i for
candidate s + 1. Then, Uαs2 (V,C) > U
αs
2
(
V,CL
)
because n∗ voters
support candidate s+ 1 and fewer voters support i.
Then for all i ∈ K, ai(V,CL) > n∗ and consequently
Uαs2
(
V,CL
)
= Σsi=1ai(V,C
L) > Σsi=1n∗ = sn∗ > s
n
s
= n
A contradiction because as we have seen Uαs2
(
V,CL
)
6 n− n∗.
Therefore, the LUAV rule satisfies JR.
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4. Final comments
Aziz et al. (2015) define a stronger version of the JR axiom that they
refer to as Extended Justified Representation (EJR). EJR conveys the idea
that a very large group of voters with similar preferences may deserve several
representatives. Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez et al. (2016) propose a modification of
EJR, Proportional Justified Representation (PJR) with the same objective.
Both properties are related to proportionality and not to the fact that the
largest number of voters obtain representation. The LUAV rule does not
fullfill even EJR or PJR. Example 2 in Aziz et al. (2015) shows this fact.
Example 2. (Example 2 in Aziz et al. (2015)) One hundred voters have
to choose a three-member committee from four candidates, K = {1, 2, 3, 4}.
Ninety-eight voters approve candidates 1 and 2, one voter approves only can-
didate 3 and the last voter approves only candidate 4.
The LUAV rule proposes committees {1, 3, 4} or {2, 3, 4} which violate
EJR and PJR.
In contexts looking for the widest representativeness of a committee, α-
unanimity for positive values of α is an appealing property. It is, in some
way, related to threshold rules (Fishburn and Pekec˘ (2004)) in the sense that
the main goal is to select a committee that represents the largest number
of voters while the relative numbers of agents supporting each candidate are
ignored. Threshold rules also take into account interdependencies among
candidates and then they provide, in general, different committees to that
provided by the LUAV rule, as the following example shows (Kilgour, 2010).
Example 3. (Example 2 in Kilgour (2010)) Nine voters have to choose a
three-member committee from 8 candidates, K = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}. Table
3 shows the voters’ ballot profile.
The LUAV rule selects the committee {2, 3, 4}, but the thresholds solutions
in Kilgour (2010) select {1, 2, 3}.
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# Voters
Candidates
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
9 3 3 2 4 1 1 1 1
Table 3: Example 3 ballots sincere profile.
Another property usually studied in voting mechanisms is strategy-proofness.
As can be seen in Example 4, the LUAV rule can be manipulated.
Example 4. Thirty voters have to choose a two-member committee from
four candidates. Let K = {1, 2, 3, 4}. Table 4 shows the voters’ sincere ballot
profile and Table 5 the voters’ insincere ballot profile, where one voter has
hidden his support for Candidate 1.
# Voters
Candidates
1 2 3 4
9 1 0 1 0
10 1 1 0 0
9 0 1 1 0
2 1 0 0 1
30 21 19 18 2
Table 4: Example 4 ballots sincere profile.
The vectors Uαs (V,C) for both voting profiles are displayed in Tables 6
and 7 respectively.
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# Voters
Candidates
1 2 3 4
1 0 0 1 0
8 1 0 1 0
10 1 1 0 0
9 0 1 1 0
2 1 0 0 1
30 20 19 18 2
Table 5: Example 4 ballots insincere profile.
C ∈ ξ2
−→αs =
(
0, 1
2
, 1
)
Uαs1 (V,C) U
αs
2 (V,C) U
αs
3 (V,C)
(1, 1, 0, 0) 30 30 10
(1, 0, 1, 0) 30 30 9
(1, 0, 0, 1) 30 21 2
(0, 1, 1, 0) 30 28 9
(0, 1, 0, 1) 30 21 0
(0, 0, 1, 1) 30 20 0
Table 6: Uαs (V,C) vectors for sincere ballot profile in Table 4.
C ∈ ξ2
−→αs =
(
0, 1
2
, 1
)
Uαs1 (V,C) U
αs
2 (V,C) U
αs
3 (V,C)
(1, 1, 0, 0) 30 29 10
(1, 0, 1, 0) 30 30 9
(1, 0, 0, 1) 30 20 2
(0, 1, 1, 0) 30 28 9
(0, 1, 0, 1) 30 21 0
(0, 0, 1, 1) 30 20 1
Table 7: Uαs (V,C) vectors for insincere ballot profile in Table 5.
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For the sincere profile in Table 4, the LUAV rule selects the committee
{1, 2} but when one voter of the first type hides his support for Candidate 1,
the LUAV rule selects {1, 3} which coincides with this voter’s sincere prefer-
ence.
In political contexts there is not special interest in the strategic aspects of
voting systems. The importance of the strategy-proofness has been discussed
in the literature and in problems with a large number of voters it is usual
to assume that voters will not be interested in manipulation because it may
be difficult and risky for a voter to try to manipulate the final outcome if he
does not exactly know the precise preferences of the other voters. Even in
the case of his knowing all the preferences, he should consider the potential
manipulation by the rest of voters.
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